As the college basketball season wraps up its first 2 months, it's clear that the talent level on display is something that hasn't been seen in a few years. There are two reasons: first, the freshman class boasts some impressive prospects. Second, some of the best prospects from last year's freshman class came back as sophomores. That decision, to turn down the draft and come back to school, seems to have worked out for college basketball fans. But does it work out for the players involved? If you devote any time to this thought, please think of Willie Warren.
For those who don't remember, Willie Warren was a McDonald's All-American who went to Oklahoma in 2008, teaming with a sophomore forward named Blake Griffin. After a freshman season that included a #2 seed in the tournament and an Elite 8 loss to eventual champion UNC, Warren had drawn the attention of several scouts, and was talked about as a potential lottery pick in the 2009 NBA Draft.
Warren faced a decision. Stay in school, or go to the NBA. After testing the waters, he decided to return to Oklahoma for his sophomore year. The season did not go well, and he ended up a 2nd round pick in the 2010 draft, going to the Clippers. 2nd round draft picks rarely get fully guaranteed contracts, and Warren was no exception. Lost in all the hoopla of the Clippers' recent Chris Paul trade, and Chauncey Billups signing? After only one season in the NBA, Wille Warren was waived this week.
What did it end up costing Willie Warren to come back to school for his sophomore year? A lot of people speculate on the relative pros and cons. Well, here are the dollars. Warren made $500k in the 2010-2011 NBA season, plus the value of one year's full ride to Oklahoma for the 2009-2010 season (optimistically, $50k). Toney Douglas, the 29th pick in the 2009 NBA Draft Warren pulled out of, has earned $2.1mm in his first two years in the league. Now, there are no guarantees that Warren would have been a 1st round pick in 2009. But, since 2006, 75% of all freshman draft entrants were drafted in the 1st round. It's not hard to do the math...
Leaving After Freshman Year: $2.1mm * 0.75 = $1.6mm earned
Returning for Sophomore Year: $0.5mm + $0.05mm = $0.6mm earned
The decision to return to school has already cost Willie Warren one million dollars in two years. According to some studies, that's almost half the money a college graduate earns in their whole life. Funny how the talking heads that bash kids like DeAndre Jordan and BJ Mullens for leaving early never seem to mention the actual value of an undergraduate degree. Why should they? It's not a million dollar decision to them if one kid stays or goes.
But it is a million dollar decision for that kid. And like most major decisions in life, he probably won't get a do-over. So, as the college basketball world prepares to question the sanity of teenagers deciding to go pro early this April, remind me: what's insane about earning more money in a year than most people do in their whole lives, to play a game? Especially when that offer doesn't last forever?
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Tuesday, December 20, 2011
Gerald Henderson's Path to 20 Points Per Game
The 2011-2012 Bobcats season does not offer fans the promise of a deep playoff run, or frankly the reasonable hope of a playoff berth. No, as previously chronicled here, the Bobcats' path to relevance involves more than a few future lottery picks. With that in mind, progress can't be measured in team success, so it needs to be measured in individual success. So, let's look at one of the more critical pieces of the puzzle: Gerald Henderson. By most accounts, his on-ball defense, shot-blocking, passing, rebounding, etc. are at least passable for shooting guards in the league. But, does he have what it takes to score at a 20+ per game clip?
Obviously, when compared to the wing players that scored 20+ points per game last season, Henderson comes up noticeably short of the mark. Not only are the attempts nowhere near the group, but efficiency is lacking on free throws, 2 point attempts, and 3 point attempts. But, the story is far different when looking at the last 23 games of the season (March and April, after the Gerald Wallace trade):
Shot attempts increase noticeably, but notice that efficiency on all shots increased. In fact, when looking at the last 23 games, he was scoring at a more efficient clip than either Stephen Jackson (.909 points per shot on 20.3 shots per game) or Gerald Wallace (.865 points per shot on 18 shots per game) did last year as Bobcats.
So, what's it going to take to make Gerald Henderson a 20 point scorer this season? In a word: seven. As in, seven more shots per game. Given his efficiency scoring the ball, all he has to do is take seven more shots at the same level he played the last 23 games. Doesn't matter what kind of shots he takes. Even if he took seven more 3's a game, with his disturbingly low accuracy on that front, he'd get there. Now, at the end of the day, even if Gerald's numbers improve, and he joins the ranks of 20 point scorers in the league, will that make the Bobcats relevant? Frankly, no. But for a team that seems several pieces away from NBA relevance at the moment, it's a small comfort that maybe one of those pieces isn't as far away as it seems.
So, what's it going to take to make Gerald Henderson a 20 point scorer this season? In a word: seven. As in, seven more shots per game. Given his efficiency scoring the ball, all he has to do is take seven more shots at the same level he played the last 23 games. Doesn't matter what kind of shots he takes. Even if he took seven more 3's a game, with his disturbingly low accuracy on that front, he'd get there. Now, at the end of the day, even if Gerald's numbers improve, and he joins the ranks of 20 point scorers in the league, will that make the Bobcats relevant? Frankly, no. But for a team that seems several pieces away from NBA relevance at the moment, it's a small comfort that maybe one of those pieces isn't as far away as it seems.
Friday, December 9, 2011
The GM Decisions That Forced Chris Paul to Leave
At the end of the 2007-2008 season, the New Orleans Hornets were fresh off a very good season. They were the #2 seed in the West (56 wins), had just lost a close 7 game series to the Spurs (the defending champs), and Chris Paul had officially claimed the unofficial title of "NBA's Best Point Guard." The arrows were clearly pointing up for the franchise. Fast forward 3+ years, and Chris Paul is ready to leave. How did this happen? Well, most players, especially great players, want to win, get paid, and live in a great place (the ranking of those three are up to you). As far as winning, the Hornets effectively used the last 3 years to show CP3, step by step, that they could not give him a roster built to win. In fact, they couldn't even maintain the success of the 2008 season.
Step 1: The Hornets Sign James Posey
Fresh off the Celtics' 2008 title run, this certainly seemed like a good idea for a Hornets team that seemed one piece away from getting their own title. However, as previously discussed in this space, this may not have been the best use of a contender's limited cap space.
Step 2: Tyson Chandler Traded to the Bobcats
Despite the friendship between Tyson Chandler and Chris Paul, the positive boost the Paul-Chandler pick and roll gave the 2008 Hornet offense, and Chandler's above-the-rim superiority to Emeka Okafor, the Hornets thought this was a move to improve the team. Today, Emeka is an albatross contract the Hornets' can't move, and Tyson Chandler just helped Dallas win its first title, essentially playing the role he played in New Orleans.
Step 3: Botching The Draft
For teams in contention, turning late 1st round picks into quality rotation players seems like a stretch. Turning those picks into starters seems like alchemy. But the Hornets' use and development of draft picks has been spotty, at best. 2008? Traded Darrell Arthur, an athletic power forward that gives great depth and minutes to the Memphis frontcourt, for cash. 2009? Actually hit on two good prospects, Darren Collison and Marcus Thornton. But, traded both of them in less than a year for Trevor Ariza / Marco Belinelli and Carl Landry, respectively. 2010? It's too early to tell, but Quincy Pondexter and Brackins haven't yet shown they're rotation pieces on a contender.
Hindsight is always 20/20, but take a look at those moves in total, and the respective rosters they created:
Roster 1: Marcus Thornton, free agent Tyson Chandler, Darrell Arthur, post-injury David West
Roster 2: Emeka Okafor, Trevor Ariza, free agent Carl Landry, post-injury David West
Looks to me like one roster is a lot more appealing than the other. And, if you're Chris Paul, you've watched the New Orleans front office turn Roster 1 into Roster 2. If you had 5-7 peak years left, assuming your knee holds up, would you believe this organization honestly gives you the best chance to win?
I wouldn't.
Step 1: The Hornets Sign James Posey
Fresh off the Celtics' 2008 title run, this certainly seemed like a good idea for a Hornets team that seemed one piece away from getting their own title. However, as previously discussed in this space, this may not have been the best use of a contender's limited cap space.
Step 2: Tyson Chandler Traded to the Bobcats
Despite the friendship between Tyson Chandler and Chris Paul, the positive boost the Paul-Chandler pick and roll gave the 2008 Hornet offense, and Chandler's above-the-rim superiority to Emeka Okafor, the Hornets thought this was a move to improve the team. Today, Emeka is an albatross contract the Hornets' can't move, and Tyson Chandler just helped Dallas win its first title, essentially playing the role he played in New Orleans.
Step 3: Botching The Draft
For teams in contention, turning late 1st round picks into quality rotation players seems like a stretch. Turning those picks into starters seems like alchemy. But the Hornets' use and development of draft picks has been spotty, at best. 2008? Traded Darrell Arthur, an athletic power forward that gives great depth and minutes to the Memphis frontcourt, for cash. 2009? Actually hit on two good prospects, Darren Collison and Marcus Thornton. But, traded both of them in less than a year for Trevor Ariza / Marco Belinelli and Carl Landry, respectively. 2010? It's too early to tell, but Quincy Pondexter and Brackins haven't yet shown they're rotation pieces on a contender.
Hindsight is always 20/20, but take a look at those moves in total, and the respective rosters they created:
Roster 1: Marcus Thornton, free agent Tyson Chandler, Darrell Arthur, post-injury David West
Roster 2: Emeka Okafor, Trevor Ariza, free agent Carl Landry, post-injury David West
Looks to me like one roster is a lot more appealing than the other. And, if you're Chris Paul, you've watched the New Orleans front office turn Roster 1 into Roster 2. If you had 5-7 peak years left, assuming your knee holds up, would you believe this organization honestly gives you the best chance to win?
I wouldn't.
Sunday, December 4, 2011
Watching Sports Through The BCS Lens
After another riveting college football regular season, it's time for the best part of the year. It's time to take all the information the sports world has gathered from the last three and a half months of games, mash up the stats and perceptions, and anoint the two participants that get to compete for the national championship. Since this system has created the most "exciting" regular season relative to other sports, isn't it time we acknowledged the primitive, flawed nature of the other major sports in determining a champion? Since the evolution of the BCS, how many other leagues have propped up imposters as their champions based on some ridiculous system that lets teams outside the top two compete?
National Basketball Association (BS Score: 54 out of 100). Over the past 13 seasons, 7 teams have laid false claim to the title in this sham of a sport. The most recent "champion," the Dallas Mavericks, couldn't even finish in the top two of its own conference, let alone the league. As a matter of fact, according to ESPN, they weren't even favored to win their 1st round series. Here's a list of "mythical" title holders over the past 13 seasons: Mavericks (2011), Spurs (2007), Heat (2006), Spurs (2005), Pistons (2004), Lakers (2002), Lakers (2001).
National Football League (BS Score: 69 out of 100). That's right, the Super Bowl we all obsessively watch every year isn't even a true title game. Complete sham. How else to explain a game where 9 of the last 13 champions didn't deserve to even play in the game? I mean, last year's Packers were the sixth best team in their conference. That means any observer with a brain would have justifiably picked five other NFC teams for the Super Bowl before they picked these clowns. Here's the list of pretenders from this sideshow: Packers (2010), Steelers (2008), Giants (2007), Colts (2006), Steelers (2005), Patriots (2004), Buccaneers (2002), Patriots (2001), Ravens (2000). If there's a silver lining here (and, believe me, I'm stretching to find one), turns out the NFL isn't the worst offender.
Men's College Basketball (BS Score: 77 out of 100). Connecticut (2011), Duke (2010), Kansas (2008), Florida (2007), Florida (2006), Connecticut (2004), Syracuse (2003), Duke (2001), Michigan State (2000), Connecticut (1999). That's right, 10 out of 13. 10 out of 13 times we wasted 3 weeks of our lives, filled out those stupid brackets, and for what? Seriously, it's like this sport doesn't even know it has a poll to rank these teams. If this level of deceipt seems hard to believe, check out the rankings for yourself. Not only did 10 champions have absolutely no right to even play for a title, but in 3 out of the last 9 years, the mythical champions weren't even preseason top 25 (UConn 2011, Florida 2006, Syracuse 2003). It's such a sham, the word "sham" isn't strong enough. I mean, the only thing that irritates me more than UConn doing something no one's ever done in Big East tournaments is watching them and Butler rob the world of the Ohio State-Kansas title game; I don't care what happened in March Madness, one of those two teams earned the true national championship.
As hard as it is to learn how much we've all been deceived by these sports, they show us why college football needs to ignore the morons that clamor for any kind of change to the current system. First, there's no money in it: these three sports have tried these flawed playoff systems, and people watch them less and less every year. Second, and more importantly, it's about more than money. It's about preserving the true spirit of sport. Because, deep down, the heart of sport is choosing who we think is best from an ever-shrinking group of eligible participants, and telling everyone else that not only are they inferior, but they'll never get a fair opportunity to prove otherwise on the field.
(In case the sarcasm was too thick, here's the same post in four words: the BCS is stupid.)
National Basketball Association (BS Score: 54 out of 100). Over the past 13 seasons, 7 teams have laid false claim to the title in this sham of a sport. The most recent "champion," the Dallas Mavericks, couldn't even finish in the top two of its own conference, let alone the league. As a matter of fact, according to ESPN, they weren't even favored to win their 1st round series. Here's a list of "mythical" title holders over the past 13 seasons: Mavericks (2011), Spurs (2007), Heat (2006), Spurs (2005), Pistons (2004), Lakers (2002), Lakers (2001).
National Football League (BS Score: 69 out of 100). That's right, the Super Bowl we all obsessively watch every year isn't even a true title game. Complete sham. How else to explain a game where 9 of the last 13 champions didn't deserve to even play in the game? I mean, last year's Packers were the sixth best team in their conference. That means any observer with a brain would have justifiably picked five other NFC teams for the Super Bowl before they picked these clowns. Here's the list of pretenders from this sideshow: Packers (2010), Steelers (2008), Giants (2007), Colts (2006), Steelers (2005), Patriots (2004), Buccaneers (2002), Patriots (2001), Ravens (2000). If there's a silver lining here (and, believe me, I'm stretching to find one), turns out the NFL isn't the worst offender.
Men's College Basketball (BS Score: 77 out of 100). Connecticut (2011), Duke (2010), Kansas (2008), Florida (2007), Florida (2006), Connecticut (2004), Syracuse (2003), Duke (2001), Michigan State (2000), Connecticut (1999). That's right, 10 out of 13. 10 out of 13 times we wasted 3 weeks of our lives, filled out those stupid brackets, and for what? Seriously, it's like this sport doesn't even know it has a poll to rank these teams. If this level of deceipt seems hard to believe, check out the rankings for yourself. Not only did 10 champions have absolutely no right to even play for a title, but in 3 out of the last 9 years, the mythical champions weren't even preseason top 25 (UConn 2011, Florida 2006, Syracuse 2003). It's such a sham, the word "sham" isn't strong enough. I mean, the only thing that irritates me more than UConn doing something no one's ever done in Big East tournaments is watching them and Butler rob the world of the Ohio State-Kansas title game; I don't care what happened in March Madness, one of those two teams earned the true national championship.
As hard as it is to learn how much we've all been deceived by these sports, they show us why college football needs to ignore the morons that clamor for any kind of change to the current system. First, there's no money in it: these three sports have tried these flawed playoff systems, and people watch them less and less every year. Second, and more importantly, it's about more than money. It's about preserving the true spirit of sport. Because, deep down, the heart of sport is choosing who we think is best from an ever-shrinking group of eligible participants, and telling everyone else that not only are they inferior, but they'll never get a fair opportunity to prove otherwise on the field.
(In case the sarcasm was too thick, here's the same post in four words: the BCS is stupid.)
Thursday, December 1, 2011
NBA Free Agents: Avoiding the Title Premium
In the NBA, there is no shortage of teams that feel like they may be one player away from perennial championship contention, one last cog away from a title-winning machine. For some teams (Knicks, Nets, Clippers), targets are major players. For others (Bulls, Thunder, Hawks, Grizzlies, Heat, Lakers, Spurs), the missing piece may be a more low key, subtle addition. While there's probably never going to be an easy way to assess a free agent's ability to develop individually, fit into a team's concept, fit into a team's locker room, etc., a common theme has emerged over the past few years: try not to over-pay for the role player that just won a ring. Not only is it unlikely he can play the way he did last spring for your new team, he may not be able to play that way again for anybody. Take a look at some notable role players from the last 3 NBA champions.
2008: James Posey (Celtics to Hornets)
Cog Factor: Played both small forward and power forward for the Celtics (giving the team added versatility to go big or small in crunch time), hit clutch threes, and played defense with the same intensity that became the hallmark of that team.
Red Flag We Should've Seen Then: During the '08 playoffs, shot 40% from three, a feat he had only accomplished once in 9 seasons of work. Also, he was 31 years old at the end of that season.
Post-Title Career: Signed with New Orleans, lowered his outside shooting accuracy in each successive year (32% last season), and is a potential amnesty candidate in the final year of his deal with the Indiana Pacers.
2009: Trevor Ariza (Lakers to Rockets)
Cog Factor: Played shooting guard and small forward, taking on opponents' most dangerous wing scorers on defense, shot 48% from three and sealed wins in the conference finals.
Red Flag We Should've Seen Then: Prior to the 2009 playoffs, Ariza's career high in 3 point percentage was 32%. Also, he was on his third team in five NBA seasons, despite oozing potential since his UCLA days.
Post-Title Career: Signed with Houston to be a 20 pt scorer despite never shooting more than 7.3 shots a game for a season. Shot less than 40% from the field in the ensuing 2 seasons (30% from three last season).
2010: Jordan Farmar (Lakers to Nets)
Cog Factor: Backed up Derek Fisher and, later, Shannon Brown during the Lakers' 2nd title run.
Red Flag We Should've Seen Then: Couldn't beat out Derek Fisher and, later, Shannon Brown for playing time.
Post-Title Career: Signed with New Jersey for a chance to start at point guard, which lasted 3 months into the season, at which point he started backing up Deron Williams.
Clearly, there are more than a few issues with signing role players fresh off the best moments of their professional careers (the last one notwithstanding, I'm actually a Jordan Farmar fan, and wish he got a real shot to run a team just once). With that in mind, take a look at some of the coveted free agents off this year's champion Dallas Mavericks.
Tyson Chandler
Cog Factor: Anchored Dallas' sneaky good defense for the title, while also providing an unexpected offensive punch.
Red Flags We Should Be Noticing: Posted career high 65% field goal percentage during the season, and near career highs in offensive and defensive rebound rates (14% and 20%) in the playoffs. Has missed 30+ games three times in his NBA career (including 2 out of the last 3 seasons). Oklahoma City rescinded a trade offer for Chandler citing health concerns, while trading for and extending Kendrick Perkins to do essentially the same job despite recently tearing his own ACL.
Deshawn Stevenson
Cog Factor: Classic D-and-3 role player for Dallas, guarding Kobe Bryant, Kevin Durant, and Lebron James/Dwayne Wade, shot 40% from 3 while taking over 3 three pointers a game.
Red Flags We Should Be Noticing: Has shot 40% from 3 for a season once in 11 NBA seasons. Only made 2 of 15 2 point attempts in 21 postseason games in 2011.
J.J. Barea
Cog Factor: Played backup point guard with particular success against the Lakers (averaged 11.5 ppg on 50% shooting, with 5.5 assists in the series).
Red Flags We Should Be Noticing: Has never shot better than 44% in any regular season, and shot 42% overall in the playoffs (39% against the Heat). Has never averaged 4.0 assists per game in season (averaged 3.4 assists per game in the 2011 playoffs). His offensive role includes running the pick-and-roll with Dirk Nowitzki, arguably the toughest and most unique screener to defend in the NBA.
Am I saying that these players aren't any good? Hardly. They just helped one of the more unlikely NBA champions in the last few years climb the mountain. But, it should be noted that, for every Tyson Chandler, there's a Samuel Dalembert. For every Deshawn Stevenson, there's a Shane Battier. For every J.J. Barea, there's a Marcus Thornton. And those guys might do the same job for a little less money next season.
2008: James Posey (Celtics to Hornets)
Cog Factor: Played both small forward and power forward for the Celtics (giving the team added versatility to go big or small in crunch time), hit clutch threes, and played defense with the same intensity that became the hallmark of that team.
Red Flag We Should've Seen Then: During the '08 playoffs, shot 40% from three, a feat he had only accomplished once in 9 seasons of work. Also, he was 31 years old at the end of that season.
Post-Title Career: Signed with New Orleans, lowered his outside shooting accuracy in each successive year (32% last season), and is a potential amnesty candidate in the final year of his deal with the Indiana Pacers.
2009: Trevor Ariza (Lakers to Rockets)
Cog Factor: Played shooting guard and small forward, taking on opponents' most dangerous wing scorers on defense, shot 48% from three and sealed wins in the conference finals.
Red Flag We Should've Seen Then: Prior to the 2009 playoffs, Ariza's career high in 3 point percentage was 32%. Also, he was on his third team in five NBA seasons, despite oozing potential since his UCLA days.
Post-Title Career: Signed with Houston to be a 20 pt scorer despite never shooting more than 7.3 shots a game for a season. Shot less than 40% from the field in the ensuing 2 seasons (30% from three last season).
2010: Jordan Farmar (Lakers to Nets)
Cog Factor: Backed up Derek Fisher and, later, Shannon Brown during the Lakers' 2nd title run.
Red Flag We Should've Seen Then: Couldn't beat out Derek Fisher and, later, Shannon Brown for playing time.
Post-Title Career: Signed with New Jersey for a chance to start at point guard, which lasted 3 months into the season, at which point he started backing up Deron Williams.
Clearly, there are more than a few issues with signing role players fresh off the best moments of their professional careers (the last one notwithstanding, I'm actually a Jordan Farmar fan, and wish he got a real shot to run a team just once). With that in mind, take a look at some of the coveted free agents off this year's champion Dallas Mavericks.
Tyson Chandler
Cog Factor: Anchored Dallas' sneaky good defense for the title, while also providing an unexpected offensive punch.
Red Flags We Should Be Noticing: Posted career high 65% field goal percentage during the season, and near career highs in offensive and defensive rebound rates (14% and 20%) in the playoffs. Has missed 30+ games three times in his NBA career (including 2 out of the last 3 seasons). Oklahoma City rescinded a trade offer for Chandler citing health concerns, while trading for and extending Kendrick Perkins to do essentially the same job despite recently tearing his own ACL.
Deshawn Stevenson
Cog Factor: Classic D-and-3 role player for Dallas, guarding Kobe Bryant, Kevin Durant, and Lebron James/Dwayne Wade, shot 40% from 3 while taking over 3 three pointers a game.
Red Flags We Should Be Noticing: Has shot 40% from 3 for a season once in 11 NBA seasons. Only made 2 of 15 2 point attempts in 21 postseason games in 2011.
J.J. Barea
Cog Factor: Played backup point guard with particular success against the Lakers (averaged 11.5 ppg on 50% shooting, with 5.5 assists in the series).
Red Flags We Should Be Noticing: Has never shot better than 44% in any regular season, and shot 42% overall in the playoffs (39% against the Heat). Has never averaged 4.0 assists per game in season (averaged 3.4 assists per game in the 2011 playoffs). His offensive role includes running the pick-and-roll with Dirk Nowitzki, arguably the toughest and most unique screener to defend in the NBA.
Am I saying that these players aren't any good? Hardly. They just helped one of the more unlikely NBA champions in the last few years climb the mountain. But, it should be noted that, for every Tyson Chandler, there's a Samuel Dalembert. For every Deshawn Stevenson, there's a Shane Battier. For every J.J. Barea, there's a Marcus Thornton. And those guys might do the same job for a little less money next season.
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