As the college basketball season wraps up its first 2 months, it's clear that the talent level on display is something that hasn't been seen in a few years. There are two reasons: first, the freshman class boasts some impressive prospects. Second, some of the best prospects from last year's freshman class came back as sophomores. That decision, to turn down the draft and come back to school, seems to have worked out for college basketball fans. But does it work out for the players involved? If you devote any time to this thought, please think of Willie Warren.
For those who don't remember, Willie Warren was a McDonald's All-American who went to Oklahoma in 2008, teaming with a sophomore forward named Blake Griffin. After a freshman season that included a #2 seed in the tournament and an Elite 8 loss to eventual champion UNC, Warren had drawn the attention of several scouts, and was talked about as a potential lottery pick in the 2009 NBA Draft.
Warren faced a decision. Stay in school, or go to the NBA. After testing the waters, he decided to return to Oklahoma for his sophomore year. The season did not go well, and he ended up a 2nd round pick in the 2010 draft, going to the Clippers. 2nd round draft picks rarely get fully guaranteed contracts, and Warren was no exception. Lost in all the hoopla of the Clippers' recent Chris Paul trade, and Chauncey Billups signing? After only one season in the NBA, Wille Warren was waived this week.
What did it end up costing Willie Warren to come back to school for his sophomore year? A lot of people speculate on the relative pros and cons. Well, here are the dollars. Warren made $500k in the 2010-2011 NBA season, plus the value of one year's full ride to Oklahoma for the 2009-2010 season (optimistically, $50k). Toney Douglas, the 29th pick in the 2009 NBA Draft Warren pulled out of, has earned $2.1mm in his first two years in the league. Now, there are no guarantees that Warren would have been a 1st round pick in 2009. But, since 2006, 75% of all freshman draft entrants were drafted in the 1st round. It's not hard to do the math...
Leaving After Freshman Year: $2.1mm * 0.75 = $1.6mm earned
Returning for Sophomore Year: $0.5mm + $0.05mm = $0.6mm earned
The decision to return to school has already cost Willie Warren one million dollars in two years. According to some studies, that's almost half the money a college graduate earns in their whole life. Funny how the talking heads that bash kids like DeAndre Jordan and BJ Mullens for leaving early never seem to mention the actual value of an undergraduate degree. Why should they? It's not a million dollar decision to them if one kid stays or goes.
But it is a million dollar decision for that kid. And like most major decisions in life, he probably won't get a do-over. So, as the college basketball world prepares to question the sanity of teenagers deciding to go pro early this April, remind me: what's insane about earning more money in a year than most people do in their whole lives, to play a game? Especially when that offer doesn't last forever?
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Tuesday, December 20, 2011
Gerald Henderson's Path to 20 Points Per Game
The 2011-2012 Bobcats season does not offer fans the promise of a deep playoff run, or frankly the reasonable hope of a playoff berth. No, as previously chronicled here, the Bobcats' path to relevance involves more than a few future lottery picks. With that in mind, progress can't be measured in team success, so it needs to be measured in individual success. So, let's look at one of the more critical pieces of the puzzle: Gerald Henderson. By most accounts, his on-ball defense, shot-blocking, passing, rebounding, etc. are at least passable for shooting guards in the league. But, does he have what it takes to score at a 20+ per game clip?
Obviously, when compared to the wing players that scored 20+ points per game last season, Henderson comes up noticeably short of the mark. Not only are the attempts nowhere near the group, but efficiency is lacking on free throws, 2 point attempts, and 3 point attempts. But, the story is far different when looking at the last 23 games of the season (March and April, after the Gerald Wallace trade):
Shot attempts increase noticeably, but notice that efficiency on all shots increased. In fact, when looking at the last 23 games, he was scoring at a more efficient clip than either Stephen Jackson (.909 points per shot on 20.3 shots per game) or Gerald Wallace (.865 points per shot on 18 shots per game) did last year as Bobcats.
So, what's it going to take to make Gerald Henderson a 20 point scorer this season? In a word: seven. As in, seven more shots per game. Given his efficiency scoring the ball, all he has to do is take seven more shots at the same level he played the last 23 games. Doesn't matter what kind of shots he takes. Even if he took seven more 3's a game, with his disturbingly low accuracy on that front, he'd get there. Now, at the end of the day, even if Gerald's numbers improve, and he joins the ranks of 20 point scorers in the league, will that make the Bobcats relevant? Frankly, no. But for a team that seems several pieces away from NBA relevance at the moment, it's a small comfort that maybe one of those pieces isn't as far away as it seems.
So, what's it going to take to make Gerald Henderson a 20 point scorer this season? In a word: seven. As in, seven more shots per game. Given his efficiency scoring the ball, all he has to do is take seven more shots at the same level he played the last 23 games. Doesn't matter what kind of shots he takes. Even if he took seven more 3's a game, with his disturbingly low accuracy on that front, he'd get there. Now, at the end of the day, even if Gerald's numbers improve, and he joins the ranks of 20 point scorers in the league, will that make the Bobcats relevant? Frankly, no. But for a team that seems several pieces away from NBA relevance at the moment, it's a small comfort that maybe one of those pieces isn't as far away as it seems.
Friday, December 9, 2011
The GM Decisions That Forced Chris Paul to Leave
At the end of the 2007-2008 season, the New Orleans Hornets were fresh off a very good season. They were the #2 seed in the West (56 wins), had just lost a close 7 game series to the Spurs (the defending champs), and Chris Paul had officially claimed the unofficial title of "NBA's Best Point Guard." The arrows were clearly pointing up for the franchise. Fast forward 3+ years, and Chris Paul is ready to leave. How did this happen? Well, most players, especially great players, want to win, get paid, and live in a great place (the ranking of those three are up to you). As far as winning, the Hornets effectively used the last 3 years to show CP3, step by step, that they could not give him a roster built to win. In fact, they couldn't even maintain the success of the 2008 season.
Step 1: The Hornets Sign James Posey
Fresh off the Celtics' 2008 title run, this certainly seemed like a good idea for a Hornets team that seemed one piece away from getting their own title. However, as previously discussed in this space, this may not have been the best use of a contender's limited cap space.
Step 2: Tyson Chandler Traded to the Bobcats
Despite the friendship between Tyson Chandler and Chris Paul, the positive boost the Paul-Chandler pick and roll gave the 2008 Hornet offense, and Chandler's above-the-rim superiority to Emeka Okafor, the Hornets thought this was a move to improve the team. Today, Emeka is an albatross contract the Hornets' can't move, and Tyson Chandler just helped Dallas win its first title, essentially playing the role he played in New Orleans.
Step 3: Botching The Draft
For teams in contention, turning late 1st round picks into quality rotation players seems like a stretch. Turning those picks into starters seems like alchemy. But the Hornets' use and development of draft picks has been spotty, at best. 2008? Traded Darrell Arthur, an athletic power forward that gives great depth and minutes to the Memphis frontcourt, for cash. 2009? Actually hit on two good prospects, Darren Collison and Marcus Thornton. But, traded both of them in less than a year for Trevor Ariza / Marco Belinelli and Carl Landry, respectively. 2010? It's too early to tell, but Quincy Pondexter and Brackins haven't yet shown they're rotation pieces on a contender.
Hindsight is always 20/20, but take a look at those moves in total, and the respective rosters they created:
Roster 1: Marcus Thornton, free agent Tyson Chandler, Darrell Arthur, post-injury David West
Roster 2: Emeka Okafor, Trevor Ariza, free agent Carl Landry, post-injury David West
Looks to me like one roster is a lot more appealing than the other. And, if you're Chris Paul, you've watched the New Orleans front office turn Roster 1 into Roster 2. If you had 5-7 peak years left, assuming your knee holds up, would you believe this organization honestly gives you the best chance to win?
I wouldn't.
Step 1: The Hornets Sign James Posey
Fresh off the Celtics' 2008 title run, this certainly seemed like a good idea for a Hornets team that seemed one piece away from getting their own title. However, as previously discussed in this space, this may not have been the best use of a contender's limited cap space.
Step 2: Tyson Chandler Traded to the Bobcats
Despite the friendship between Tyson Chandler and Chris Paul, the positive boost the Paul-Chandler pick and roll gave the 2008 Hornet offense, and Chandler's above-the-rim superiority to Emeka Okafor, the Hornets thought this was a move to improve the team. Today, Emeka is an albatross contract the Hornets' can't move, and Tyson Chandler just helped Dallas win its first title, essentially playing the role he played in New Orleans.
Step 3: Botching The Draft
For teams in contention, turning late 1st round picks into quality rotation players seems like a stretch. Turning those picks into starters seems like alchemy. But the Hornets' use and development of draft picks has been spotty, at best. 2008? Traded Darrell Arthur, an athletic power forward that gives great depth and minutes to the Memphis frontcourt, for cash. 2009? Actually hit on two good prospects, Darren Collison and Marcus Thornton. But, traded both of them in less than a year for Trevor Ariza / Marco Belinelli and Carl Landry, respectively. 2010? It's too early to tell, but Quincy Pondexter and Brackins haven't yet shown they're rotation pieces on a contender.
Hindsight is always 20/20, but take a look at those moves in total, and the respective rosters they created:
Roster 1: Marcus Thornton, free agent Tyson Chandler, Darrell Arthur, post-injury David West
Roster 2: Emeka Okafor, Trevor Ariza, free agent Carl Landry, post-injury David West
Looks to me like one roster is a lot more appealing than the other. And, if you're Chris Paul, you've watched the New Orleans front office turn Roster 1 into Roster 2. If you had 5-7 peak years left, assuming your knee holds up, would you believe this organization honestly gives you the best chance to win?
I wouldn't.
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